Game Theory And National Security Pdf
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Game Theory and National Security
Deterrence theory is the idea that an inferior force, by virtue of the destructive power of the force's weapons, could deter a more powerful adversary if the force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. The doctrine gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and is related to but distinct from the concept of mutual assured destruction , which models the preventative nature of full-scale nuclear attack that would devastate both parties in a nuclear war. Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action that has not yet started by means of threat of reprisal,  or to prevent it from doing something that another state desires. The strategy is based on the psychological concept of the same name. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in , must be always ready but never used. Thomas Schelling 's classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence.
PDF | This chapter describes the basic assumptions of game theory and illustrates its major concepts, using examples drawn from the security studies analysed interstate conﬂicts as zero-sum games. national politics.
For many Americans in the late s and early s, game theory was a way for scientists, in collusion with the US government, to prevent nuclear exchange by conceptualizing the Cold War as a game, and by playing this game according to specific rational strategies. The first part of the essay describes how the game theory narrative popularized the idea that the rationality of pure mathematics could be applied to manage some major threats of the Cold War—the menace of an unknown enemy and the specter of an accidental nuclear exchange. The following sections explore how this narrative was both exemplified and criticized by a variety of creative works and other artifacts of Cold War culture.
Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, is then analyzed.
Боль стала утихать, туман перед глазами постепенно таял. Он посмотрелся в зеркало. Вид был такой, будто он не переставая рыдал несколько дней подряд. Беккер вытер лицо рукавом пиджака, и тут его осенило. От волнений и переживаний он совсем забыл, где находится.
Когда-нибудь он станет мировым стандартом. Сьюзан глубоко вздохнула. - Да поможет нам Бог, - прошептала. - Мы можем принять участие в аукционе. Стратмор покачал головой: - Танкадо дал нам шанс.
Вспыхнувший экран был совершенно пуст. Несколько этим озадаченная, она вызвала команду поиска и напечатала: НАЙТИ: СЛЕДОПЫТ Это был дальний прицел, но если в компьютере Хейла найдутся следы ее программы, то они будут обнаружены. Тогда станет понятно, почему он вручную отключил Следопыта.